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INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
Glen T. Broach, Winthrop University 
For most of South Carolina's history, the primacy of the 
General Assembly in local matters has been almost absolute and rarely 
questioned. The various state constitutions, through the Constitution of 
1895, give almost all authority over local structure and function to 
legislators in Columbia who have been only infrequently willing to 
relinquish their powers and expand the sphere of local autonomy. 
This paternalism is fully consistent with South Carolina's 
traditionalistic political culture and its pre-industrial political economy. 
Traditionalistic values asserted that the state was best governed by a 
relatively small cabal of statewide political and economic elites. Thus 
there was little need for counties and city governments to possess 
independent powers or the authority to organize themselves as they saw 
fit. And as long as the state's political economy remained 
predominantly agricultural, there was little apparent need to provide 
local governments with the capability to provide the more complex 
services of an industrial society or to compete in a post-industrial global 
economy. 
The social and economic changes which have swept the nation and 
the South in the last half of the twentieth century have placed 
considerable stress on South Carolina's traditionalistic system of 
intergovernmental relations and have inaugurated a period of adjustment 
in the relationship between the state government in Columbia and cities 
and counties across the state. First, the civil rights movement and the 
end of legal segregation have removed the linchpin of traditionalism 
and have moderated both its repressive tendencies and attendant fears 
of disrupting social and economic influences from outside the state. 
The opening up of the state in tum inaugurated a period of 
unprecedented social change and economic growth, integrating South 
Carolina, especially its urban and suburban regions, into the industrial 
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world of the twentieth century. Along with the rest of the nation, 
South Carolina and its cities and counties now find themselves part of 
a global economy and must compete with other locales for a share of 
the world's increasingly mobile capital. 
These developments have compelled South Carolina to re-examine 
its governmental institutions to bring them into conformity with a more 
diverse industrial economy and the competitive demands of the global 
marketplace. At the state level, the most important changes have 
strengthened the state executive at the expense of the long-dominant 
General Assembly. In the sphere of intergovernmental relations, 
reforms have also, at least in principle, eroded the General Assembly's 
traditional ascendancy in South Carolina government and imposed the 
more market-based values of the individualistic political culture upon 
the state-local relationship. 
The most important institutional manifestation of the 
intergovernmental order bas been the granting of "home rule" to cities 
and counties in the mid- l 970s. Yet the devolution of power to local 
governments bas been only partial and remains incomplete in some of 
its most important aspects. Vestigial remains of the traditionalistic top-
down relationship between the state and local governments continue to 
shape intergovernmental relations in South Carolina. This article 
focuses on two aspects of that relationship which most clearly reflect 
the tension between the state's traditionalistic cultural heritage and 
emerging individualistic norms and practices: the failure of the General 
Assembly to include fiscal autonomy in its grant of home rule to 
localities; and the continued economic and political weaknesses of 
South Carolina's cities. 
The Unfulfilled Promise of Home Rule 
Upon the adoption of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895, 
the General Assembly moved quickly to assert its accustomed authority 
over local government. Counties were limited to traditional "county 
purposes" such as roads, prisons and law enforcement and were 
governed by the county legislative delegations through a device called 
the "supply bill", a local appropriations measure of the General 
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Assembly which served as the county's budget. 1 As legal 
corporations, municipalities were not as completely under the heel of 
the General Assembly as were counties, but cities and towns continued 
to be limited in their authority by legislation which granted them 
powers by population category and by special legislation which limited 
their authority to undertake new responsibilities. 2 
South Carolina's system of weak local governments was an 
outgrowth of traditionalistic culture and was perhaps suited to the 
state's pre-industrial political economy until the mid-twentieth century 
when the coming of civil rights accelerated economic development and 
brought intense pressure for change. As the economy grew in the 
1960s and 1970s, businesses and individual citizens, many recently 
transplanted from more developed regions, began to demand better 
local services and more responsive local institutions. 3 Moreover, 
court-mandated reapportionment under the one-person, one-vote 
principle forced the South Carolina General Assembly to adopt single-
member legislative districts, thereby removing the representational 
underpinnings of county government by legislative delegations. 
In 1972 the voters of South Carolina approved, and in 1973 the 
General Assembly ratified, a constitutional amendment which allowed 
the General Assembly to provide by general law for the structure and 
powers of local governments. Subsequently, in 1975, the General 
Assembly exercised this new authority and adopted the Local 
Government Act, usually referred to as the Home Rule Act. The 
legislation provides for counties to establish their own governments, 
choosing from among five organizational structures outlined in the law. 
Thus the supply bill became obsolete and counties were given the 
power to enact ordinances, organize departments and adopt their own 
budgets. Hence the major achievement of the new legislation was the 
effective re-creation of the South Carolina county as a new, quasi-
independent unit of local government. The legislation's major effect on 
municipalities was its supercession of most local special legislation by 
a more general and uniform grant of authority to cities and towns.4 
Although the home rule legislation departed sharply from the state's 
tradition of paternalistic rule from Columbia, it failed to remove all 
limitations and constraints imposed on local governments by the state. 
The General Assembly still has broad powers over local government 
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responsibilities and capabilities. Indeed it may be said that the impact 
of the law has been to impose new public service burdens on local 
governments without providing them with the necessary tools to meet 
those responsibilities. The most important of these constraints are the 
provisions of state law which deprive cities and counties of fiscal 
autonomy and saddle them with additional financial burdens . 
The Issue of Fiscal Home Rule 
With some minor exceptions , most notably a local option one-
cent sales tax which can only be adopted by county referendum, the 
General Assembly under the 1895 Constitution has limited local 
governments to the local property tax as virtually their only independent 
source of tax revenue . Since the passage of the Local Government Act 
in 1975, prevailing opinion in the General Assembly has held that home 
rule does not extend to taxation and that local governments must 
continue to receive specific legislative authorization for the adoption of 
any new taxes. Local governments and proponents of a more liberal 
interpretation of home rule have argued that without more fiscal 
flexibility , the recently-granted structural and functional autonomy of 
South Carolina's local governments is incomplete, imposing new duties 
and expectations on cities and counties but withholding the revenue 
raising capability needed to meet those responsibilities . The fiscal bind 
thus imposed on South Carolina's local governments has been made 
worse by the end of federal revenue sharing and sharp reductions in 
other federal programs for local governments during the decades of the 
1980's and 1990's. 
The reality of this dilemma is revealed by Table 1, which shows a 
steady decline over the years in the federal share of municipal and 
county revenues accompanied by a concomitant rise in dependence upon 
locally-generated revenues . The table also shows a decline in state-
provided revenues which parallels the reductions in federal assistance. 
These figures show clearly why South Carolina local governments place 
a high priority on " fiscal home rule." In an era of growing local 
responsibility and attendant fiscal stress, they are receiving fewer 
dollars in intergovernmental transfers and having to rely increasingly 
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Table 1 
Percentage of Total Revenues by Source of Funds 











































Source: SCACIR, Home Rule in South Carolina, pp. 26-27. 
Note: Local revenues include interlocal transfers. 
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on local revenues. This is particularly true of municipalities, whose 
reliance on local revenues has grown by one-third ·since 1976. 
Clearly South Carolina's cities and counties face a revenue crisis 
as population growth places new demands upon them for both facilities 
and services. From 1970 to 1990, a period as we have seen of sharp 
decline in intergovernmental support for local governments, South 
Carolina's population increased by 34 percent. The overwhelming bulk 
of this population growth (92 percent) occurred in the state's 22 
metropolitan and coastal counties, which together . experienced a 
population increase of 40.3 percent. The remaining 24 counties grew 
in population only 13 percent and accounted for only 8 percent of the 
population increase for the state as a whole. 5 Not surprisingly, the 
chorus of voices calling for fiscal home rule has been loudest in the 
metropolitan and coastal counties where the greatest service and 
infrastructure stresses are occurring. 
These voices have received some legal support from the South 
Carolina Supreme Court. In two cases in which it has had the 
opportunity to rule on the fiscal powers of local government under 
home rule, the Court has ruled clearly in favor of a flexible 
interpretation of local revenue raising powers. In Williams v. The 
Town of Hilton Head Island, the court sustained a municipal real estate 
transfer fee earmarked for environmental preservation, ruling that under 
home rule the municipality did not require specific legislative 
authorization to levy the fee. 6 And in a more recent case the court 
sustained the imposition of new accommodations and restaurant meal 
taxes by cities and counties as proper exercises of the General 
Assembly's grant of power to local governments to "enact any ..... 
ordinance necessary and proper for the .... general welfare. "7 The 
latter decision departed radically from the prevailing interpretation of 
the relationship between acts of the General Assembly and local taxing 
authority, raising a furor among legislators. The reaction has been so 
intense that the decision may have the effect of further limiting local 
taxing powers rather than expanding them. There is currently a strong 
movement within the General Assembly to place further limits upon 
local fiscal authority such as the requirement of extraordinary majorities 
of local governing bodies for the imposition of any new taxes. 
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However the current legislative controversy may be resolved, South 
Carolina local governments will continue to act in a political and fiscal 
climate in which they are dependent upon grants of taxing authority by 
a General Assembly which is largely unfriendly to local fiscal 
autonomy. 
Limits on Local Borrowing Authority 
The problem of local revenue flexibility is compounded by 
state-imposed limits on the borrowing authority of local governments. 
Current state law limits the bonded indebtedness of local governments 
to 8 percent of the assessed value of property within their jurisdictions. 
Any indebtedness over this limit can be incurred only with a popular 
referendum, an endorsement increasingly difficult to obtain in an age 
of citizen resistance to higher property taxes. This restriction severely 
hampers the ability of South Carolina cities and counties to meet the 
growing infrastructure needs of a developing economy and increasing 
population. Faced with these constraints, South Carolina local 
governments are increasingly turning to lease-purchase agreements as 
a way of overcoming state limitations on financing capital projects. 
These arrangements typically involve higher costs than traditional 
financing, but local governments have been unsuccessful in lobbying 
the General Assembly for legislation to ease state limits on local 
indebtedness. 
Unfunded Mandates 
Like local governments around the country, South Carolina 
cities and counties have been increasingly burdened by both state and 
federally-imposed regulatioJ!S which require new, unfunded financial 
responsibilities. By far the most fiscally burdensome of these 
regulations are imposed by the federal government and "passed 
through" to localities by state governments, including South Carolina. 
A survey of Greenville County local governments in 1993 concluded 
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that nine area governments were required to spend $130 million to 
comply with ten major federal regulatory requirements, including those 
laid down by the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act and the 
Americans With Disabilities Act. 8 
Unfunded mandates are also imposed by South Carolina state 
government, often independent of any federal requirement. The most 
prominent of these mandates are the requirements of the 1991 South 
Carolina Solid Waste management Act which have imposed additional 
costs upon both cities and counties in waste disposal and landfill 
standards . But other state requirements also impose significant fiscal 
burdens upon local governments , including state regulation of jails, 
which impacts especially upon counties, juvenile justice standards, 
responsibilities imposed upon county health departments and a wide 
variety of other statutory and administrative mandates. 
For the most part these have had salutary effects on local 
government in South Carolina . Coupled with federal regulations, they 
have improved the breadth and quality of local services and programs. 
But for the most part these improvements have brought with them 
increased financial burdens which local governments , given the political 
climate and state restrictions on their revenue-raising capacity, have 
found increasingly difficult to meet. 
In response to the pleas of local governments, the General 
Assembly has passed two pieces of recent legislation to remedy the 
mandates problem. A fiscal note requirement adopted in 1991 provides 
for the State Budget Division to construct a fiscal note estimating the 
projected cost of proposed legislation to local governments. The 
estimation process involves participation by local governments from 
around the state. And in 1992 the General Assembly passed legislation 
requiring a two-thirds supermajority in each house for the imposition 
of new unfunded mandates on counties. The legislation contains a 
number of crucial exceptions , most importantly Federal pass-through 
provisions and criminal justice mandates. Moreover, the measure does 
nothing to address the continuing cost of pre-existing legislative 
mandates and traditional county support provided for state agencies and 
functions. 9 
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The burdens imposed by unfunded mandates intensify the fiscal 
dilemmas confronted by South Carolina cities and counties as they seek 
to cope with the policy problems engendered by the economic and 
social modernization of recent decades. Some of the less tractable 
problems are most intense in South Carolina' s major urban areas, 
where state policy and practice place special constraints on the ability 
of municipalities to seek ways to remedy them. 
The Special Problems of South Carolina Cities 
Nowhere is the clash more pronounced between South 
Carolina' s traditionalistic heritage and the realities of an emerging 
individualistic culture than in the state's rapidly developing metropolitan 
areas. South Carolina has experienced phenomenal economic and 
population growth in its metropolitan areas over the past four decades. 
In 1990 16 South Carolina counties were included in Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas as defined by the U.S. Census. These counties had a 
combined population of almost 2.5 million, or 69.5 percent of the 
state' s total population. Nationally, 74.5 percent of all Americans live 
in MSAs. South Carolina ' s metropolitan counties have almost doubled 
in population over the past four decades and together account for 87 .3 
percent of the state's total population growth since 1950. 
The vast bulk of this growth has taken place on the suburban 
fringe, outside the boundaries of the state's major cities. While the 
population of the metropolitan counties as a whole was almost 
doubling, from 1950 to 1990 the combined population of the cities 
which the U. S. Census now uses to designate the state's metropolitan 
areas (Columbia, Greenville, Charleston, North Charleston, 
Spartanburg, Aiken, Rock Hill, Florence, Myrtle Beach, Sumter and 
Anderson) increased by only 64 percent. Most of this increase in the 
urban population took place in peripheral cities such as Anderson and 
North Charleston, or in the coastal city of Myrtle Beach. South 
Carolina's traditional major cities-Charleston, Columbia, Greenville 
and Spartanburg-increased in population by only 9 percent over the 
same period. Thus, for example, Greenville, which lies at the heart of 
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an urbanized county of 320,000 and is the largest city in an MSA of 
830,000, bas a mere 58,000 residents within its corporate limits. 
Together the state's central cities constitute a mere 23.2 percent of 
South Carolina's MSA population. 
Indeed, the term central city may be a misnomer in South Carolina, 
where metropolitan areas are widely dispersed around multiple growth 
points. A once-rural and predominantly agricultural society bas been 
transformed into a largely suburban, rather than urban, milieu. Thus 
the state's municipalities, after long having their interests ignored by 
rural-dominated political institutions, now see their suburban neighbors 
in political ascendancy. And they continue to be deprived of the 
autonomy they need to confront the problems of growth which 
surround, envelope and increasingly isolate them. 
Apart from the state-imposed fiscal restraints which municipalities 
share with counties, the most significant power currently denied to 
South Carolina's municipalities is the ability to expand their boundaries 
and incorporate the growth which is mushrooming around them. It is 
this limitation which accounts for the weakness, in both size and 
political clout, of South Carolina's cities amidst the rapid growth of the 
state's metropolitan areas. 
Under current state law, municipalities in South Carolina are 
limited to annexation by petition of property-holders in the area to be 
annexed. 10 The method most often used is by petition of 75 percent 
of the "freeholders" in the area. Annexations effected by this method 
are subject to challenge in state courts and there are deadlines and 
specific administrative requirements which can make implementation 
difficult. A simpler method is available through a petition signed by 
all persons owning real estate in the given area. This method is often 
used by developers seeking incorporation into a municipality in order 
to gain access to city services. 
While South Carolina law also provides for annexation by 
referendum, the vote can only be invoked by petition of the property-
owners in the to-be-annexed area. This requirement, giving 
"freeholders" a special status in the electoral process, bas been ruled 
by both state and federal courts to be a violation of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution. 11 
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Perhaps the most convincing evidence of the General Assembly's lack 
of responsiveness to urban needs has been its failure to take action to 
bring the provisions of these laws in line with constitutional 
requirements. 
Attempts by South Carolina cities to expand their boundaries 
therefore are largely confined to new contiguous developments where 
owners seek to tap into urban services. Since most of these services 
can be provided in other ways in South Carolina, particularly through 
electrical cooperatives and special service districts, the incentives to 
annexation are often non-existent and, as growth patterns in recent 
decades testify, much new development takes place outside of 
municipalities. And developers seem to avoid especially the larger 
cities with greater tax burdens and more intense urban problems. 
Restrictions on the growth of municipalities is a major cause of the 
stagnation of South Carolina's cities and the growing separation of 
metropolitan resources from urban problems. Table 2 compares the 
1989 poverty rate for the state as a whole with the rates for the 
metropolitan counties and the central cities within those counties. 
Although the metropolitan counties have a poverty rate three percentage 
points below the statewide rate, cities within metropolitan areas have 
Table 2 
Percent of Population Below Poverty Line 
South Carolina and Metropolitan Areas 
(1989) 
Metropolitan Counties 12.0 
MSA-Designated Cities 19.1 
The State 15 .4 
Source: South Carolina Statistical Abstract, 1994 
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an average rate four points above the state rate and seven points above 
that for metropolitan areas as a whole. Comparative poverty rates are 
a significant indicator of the concentration of social problems in South 
Carolina's cities as compared with the burgeoning and prospering 
suburban fringe. The state's restrictive annexation policy is a major 
factor contributing to this persistent and growing gap. 
Apart from restrictions it places upon the growth of municipalities, 
state policy disadvantages South Carolina's urban areas more generally 
by encouraging the fragmentation and proliferation of governments 
within metropolitan areas. State law governing incorporation is 
relatively permissive, allowing communities outside municipal 
boundaries to form new municipalities with relative ease. And state 
law is also relatively liberal with respect to the formation of special 
service districts, which can often provide utility, recreation, fire 
protection and other services, nullifying incentives to the expansion of 
units of general government. Current law governing the consolidation 
of local governments, which could potentially provide some remedy to 
the problem of governmental proliferation in metropolitan areas, is so 
replete with loopholes and options for governmental units as to be 
rendered impracticable in most cases. 12 
South Carolina's central cities clearly can be classified as 
"inelastic" cities, to use the characterization David Rusk employs to 
differentiate cities which can expand their boundaries into areas of 
suburban development from those whose expansion is restricted by state 
law. 13 Rusk's study of cities around the United States emphasizes the 
importance of central city vitality to the overall economic and social 
health of the metropolitan region. With virtually no elasticity available 
to South Carolina's cities, their politicaJ and economic weakness is a 
potentially significant drag on the economic development of the state as 
a whole. A potential point of comparison lies just to the north, where 
the growth of North Carolina's cities has been accompanied by 
economic growth which has consistently outstripped that of its neighbor 
to the south. While three of South Carolina's five largest cities have 
declined in population since 1970, more liberal annexation laws in 
North Carolina have resulted in an average growth for its five largest 
cities over the same period of 42 percent. 14 
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Conclusion 
Recent sessions of the South Carolina General Assembly, 
responding to the current conservative climate and the anti-government 
sentiment which lies at its core, have seen a reaction against local 
autonomy. Lawmakers have introduced a flood of proposals to restrict 
local powers in the name of less government. These developments 
have intensified concerns about the adequacy of South Carolina's 
intergovernmental system for the demands of the late twentieth century. 
The major local government organizations, the South Carolina 
Municipal Association and the South Carolina Association of Counties, 
have had to abandon their agendas of reform in favor of a defensive 
operation against further limitations upon local autonomy. The South 
Carolina Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, which 
over the years has conducted a number of carefully executed and 
thorough studies advocating stronger local governments with fewer state 
restrictions, has also seen its aggressive and forward-looking agenda set 
back by the current political climate. 
At the heart of the problems faced by South Carolina local 
governments lies the continuing tension between the vestiges of 
traditionalism in the state's political institutions and the new 
individualism which is emerging in the state's economy, society and 
politics. While recognizing in the granting of home rule the need for 
more autonomous and entrepreneurial local governments, the state 
government nevertheless preserves much of the substance of 
traditionalism by withholding the critical fiscal powers necessary for 
local governments to carry out their new responsibilities. And South 
Carolina's cities continue to be hampered by restrictions on their 
powers which remain from an earlier era of traditionalistic rural 
dominance. · 
The new centers of power in South Carolina lie in the metropolitan 
suburbs and in the resort and tourism developments along the coast. 
The political culture of these new power centers is deeply grounded in 
the market values of individualism, and is just as deeply distrustful of 
a direct role for government in providing jobs and opportunity. Indeed, 
the values of suburban South Carolina's political culture conform 
closely to Elaur's characterization of individualism as encouraging 
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private initiative and economic development whole favoring new 
programs only upon strong public demand. is 
While shaped more by individualistic than traditionalistic values, 
the prevailing suburban norms of South Carolina political life are fully 
consistent with the state's heritage of anti-urbanism and weak local 
governments. Among the more salient characteristics of suburban 
political life are an antipathy to the city and a decline in a sense of 
community inclusive of the diversity of metropolitan areas. 16 Thus the 
future of intergovernmental relations in South Carolina will be 
characterized by a continuing struggle between forces determined to 
limit the scope of local authority, especially the power of cities, and 
local governments seeking expanded autonomy to cope with the new 
realities of growth and competition in the global economy. 
Glen T. Broach is a Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Political 
Science Department at Winthrop University 
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